Ebrahim AlhamedFrameworks Library

m.04 · I · Position the firm · Competitive Dynamics

Commitment & Capacity Games

Ghemawat · commitment · capacity pre-emption · move and counter-move.

Competition between a few large rivals is a sequence of moves. The moves that matter are commitments — investments in capacity, technology or position that are costly to undo and visible to rivals. A credible commitment shifts the game by changing your rival's best response: it can deter entry, pre-empt capacity, or force accommodation. Read every major move by asking what it locks in, what it signals, and how the rival will rationally counter. — after Ghemawat

Reading a Rival Move

Walk any major competitive move — yours or theirs — through these gates before you commit capital.

Is the move reversible?

  • Yes — easy to undo

    Tactical move only — price tweak, promotion, talk. It signals intent but does not change the game. Watch, do not react with capital.

  • No — sunk and visible

    Does it change the rival's best response?

    • Yes — alters their payoff

      What is the commitment doing?

      • Pre-empting capacity or position

        Will the rival accommodate or fight? Accommodate if your commitment makes their entry or expansion unprofitable; fight if they have deeper pockets, sunk assets of their own, or strategic stakes that make retreat costlier than war.

      • Raising rival's cost to compete
      • Signalling toughness or softness

        Is the signal credible? A signal is only credible when backed by something irreversible — capacity built, contracts signed, reputation staked. Cheap talk is ignored by rational rivals.

    • No — symbolic

Named ideas to remember.

Commitment as Strategy · Ghemawat · Commitment 1991
Irreversibility · Visibility to rivals · Effect on rival's best response
A move that is reversible is tactics; a move that is irreversible and visible is strategy.
Capacity Pre-emption · after Ghemawat
First-mover capacity build · Deterrence of rival entry or expansion · Post-entry punishment credibility
Pre-empt only when you can fill the capacity and when doing so makes rival entry unprofitable.
Deter vs Accommodate · after Ghemawat
Deter: make entry or expansion unprofitable for rival · Accommodate: allow rival a share, avoid destructive rivalry
Deterrence requires both the ability and the will to punish; without both, it is not credible.

Before committing capital in a concentrated market.

  1. Ask: is this reversible? If yes, it is tactics. If no, it is a strategic move that deserves the full analysis.
  2. Map the rival's payoffs. How does this move change what your rival will rationally do? Draw the game tree.
  3. Check credibility. Can you actually follow through on the implied threat or commitment? If not, the rival will call the bluff.
  4. Estimate the rival's sunk assets. A rival with large sunk investments may fight even when accommodation is rational on paper.
  5. Decide: deter or accommodate? Deterrence destroys value if it triggers a war. Accommodation can be rational if it preserves a profit pool.

Key reading · Casadesus-Masanell et al. · HBS Case 707-447

Airbus vs. Boeing (A).

The Airbus-Boeing duopoly from 1992 illustrates strategic commitment: capacity investments of $4-20 billion are irreversible, visible, and change each rival's best response for a decade. The case shows how to read whether to go alone (pre-empt the super-jumbo market) or collaborate, and how divergent beliefs about market size drive asymmetric commitments.

In a duopoly, every capital decision is a message to the rival. Make sure it says what you intend.

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